



REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

TNI and MOOTW: From Internal Security to Pandemic Management

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OUTLINES

1. Introduction.
2. Logic and drive for MOOTW.
3. Case study: the role of TNI in Covi-19 Pandemic responses.
4. Prospects and challenges to MOOTW implementation.
5. Conclusion.




INTRODUCTION

1. Reality: MOOTW around the world is common, legal, and even necessary - Covid-19 pandemic responses exemplify this reality.
2. Expectation (CMR perspective): MOOTW should neither affect military professionalism, nor military political neutrality.
3. How to marry reality and expectation: MOOTW should not be about whether, but about how – by scrutinizing the rationale, prospects and challenges.

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1. Policy process on MOOTW is the product of interplays between legality, government, and the military.
2. Legality: Attitudes of the government and military towards the laws on MOOTW.
3. Push factors: military internal factors that drive engagements in MOOTW.
4. Pull factors: military external factors that drive engagements in MOOTW.





2. THE LOGIC AND DRIVER

A. Legal Basis

1. Law 3/ 2002, article 7 (3): to face with **non-military threats**, relevant ministers/ agencies outside the field of defense as the main element to be responsible – **supported by other nation's instruments of power (including TNI through MOOTW)**.
2. President Regulation 8/2021 explains further TNI's roles as supporting elements to face non-military threats (7 dimensions, and 46 types).
3. Law 3/ 2002, article 10 (3) c): to carry out defense policy through MOOTW (in the forms of civic mission, assistance to the police to keep law order, assistance to civilian government, security of navigation at sea/ aviation, search and rescue, evacuation, security of victims of natural disasters) – **carried out based on request and/ or according to the law.**
4. Law 34/ 2004, article 7 (2): 14 types of MOOTW



2. THE LOGIC AND DRIVER

B. Characterizing MOOTW in Indonesia (based on Law 34/ 2004, article 7 (2))

Actors Timing	Long-Term, Regular	Temporary, conditional (spectrum and scale of threats)
Purely military	4) Secure the border area; 6) Carrying out world peace tasks; 7) Securing the president and vice president; 8) Strengthen the defense area; 11) Protection of state guests; (follow established SOPs)	1) Overcome armed separatist movements; 2) Overcome armed rebellion; 3) Overcome acts of terrorism; (need in-time government/ political decisions)
Assisting other agencies/ joint military-civilian	5) Secure strategic national vital objects; 14) Assist the government in securing shipping and aviation against piracy, piracy, and smuggling. (follow established SOPs, but need request and/ or political decisions)	9) Assist the local government; 10) Assisting the police in maintaining public order and security as regulated by law; 12) Overcoming the consequences of natural disasters, displacement, and humanitarian assistance; 13) Assist search and rescue in accidents; (need request and/ or political decisions)



3. THE ROLES OF TNI IN COVID-19 PANDEMIC RESPONSES

A. THREE EMERGING TRENDS IN GLOBAL CIVIL-MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS

Trend types	Key characteristics	Response examples*
1 Minimal technical military support	Civilian leadership-military niche tasks in transportation and supply chain, border control	Japan, Taiwan, Canada, Kerala, Sweden, New Zealand, South Korea
2 Blended civil-military response	Civilian leadership-military support in organisation and logistics; air repatriations, border controls, mobile testing, quarantine and lockdown enforcement, emergency field hospitals	Nigeria, Kenya, US, France, UK, China, Vietnam, South Africa, Singapore
3 Military-led response	Military leadership in response planning and coordination, emergency hospitals, contact-tracing, surveillance, border controls, quarantine and lockdown enforcement	Indonesia. Philippines, Iran, Pakistan, Brazil, Peru

Source: Fauzia Gibson, “Military Response to Covid-19, emerging trends in global civil-military engagement”, *Review of International Studies*, Jan 2021

B. Policy process. e.g. a policy that involved TNI in dealing with Covid-19 Pandemic, through Presidential Decrees Number (7, 9, 12, and 82)/2020. TNI did not request to get involved, nor did it lead.



The Dynamics of Policy Process	
Presidential Decree 7/2020	There is no TNI/ MoD in leadership, just an operational element
Presidential Decree 9/2020	TNI/ MoD in leadership team

Head Of The Covid-19 Task Force (According to Presidential Decree Number 9/2020)

Head Of The Covid-19 Task Force: BNPB

- Deputy I : S.G of Ministry of Health
- Deputy II : Secretary of Ministry of State Owned Enterprises
- Deputy III : S.G of National Resilience Council
- Deputy IV : **Chief of Operational (TNI)**
- Deputy V : Chief of Operational (Polri)
- Member : 33 agencies including the TNI



3. THE ROLES OF TNI IN COVID-19 PANDEMIC RESPONSES

C. PUSH-PULL FACTORS (Pre-determined themes)

a. Pull factors (external to military)

Government assessment of the crisis, of the military capacity and assets, and of the incapacity of civilian institution.



b. Push factors (internal to military)

Institutional legacy, historical experiences, self-perception, leaders' political ambitions.

Pull factors > Push factors



3. THE ROLES OF TNI IN COVID-19 PANDEMIC RESPONSES



D. FORMS OF SUPPORT FROM TNI IN COVID-19 PANDEMIC RESPONSES

MILITARY HOSPITALS

TNI's hospitals accounts for 4% the total hospitals in Indonesia (around 2.343 bed-rooms), 5 battalions' field hospitals (650 beds beds), and 3 ship hospitals).

MEDICAL PERSONNELS

TNI has 33.500 doctors and 105.147 nurses who actively assisted in dealing with covid-19 pandemic.

DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL EQUIPMENTS

Involving aircraft C-130, B-373, C-295, navy's ships total 450.400 units of medical protective uniforms, and around 2 millions packages of drug.

VACINATION

Around 200.000 vaccination per day involving medical companies, and military pharmacy units actively involved in vaccine researches.

TRACING AND MONITORING

Involving TNI 95.000 personnel as part of task force to carry out tracing and monitoring.





3. THE ROLES OF TNI IN COVID-19 PANDEMIC RESPONSES

E. Characterizing TNI/ MOD's roles

INSTITUTIONS	TYPES OF ROLES	DETAILS	IMPACT
TNI	Health sector	(PCR, PPE, health facilities and equipment, medical personnel, distribution, tracking medical intelligence such as massive sampling, R&D for vaccines)	How much has covid-19 pandemic change the perspective in defense strategic planning?
	Security sector	Imposing physical distancing, routine patrol on the border to avoid illegal migrant, contingency plan to reduce social disturbances)	
	Socio-economic sector	(Distribution of food, providing public kitchen, and assistance to people in need)	
MOD	Inter-agency cooperation	With government agencies, private companies, and state-owned enterprises.	
	International cooperation	To buy medical equipment and vaccines.	

Source: Sari, Marina Ika; Yuli Ari Sulistyani; Andhini C Pertiwi, “The Role of the Defense Institutions in Handling the Covid-19 Pandemic”, *Jurnal Pertahanan & Bela Negara*, August 2020, Vol. 10, No. 2.



4. PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES


A. CLASIFIKATION BASED ON CHARACTERISTICS

Characteristics	Prospects	Challenges
Purely military	Most likely to continue with similar patterns, with increased capacity.	Human rights issues on MOOTW: 1) separatism, 2) rebellion, and 3) terrorism
Assisting other agencies/ joint military-civilian	Most likely to continue with similar patterns, with increased capacity.	CMR issues on MOOTW: 9) Assist the local government; CIMIC issues on MOOTW: 10) Assisting the police in maintaining public order and security as regulated by law; 12) Overcoming the consequences of natural disasters, displacement, and humanitarian assistance; 13) Assist search and rescue in accidents

B. WHAT NEXT? – General challenges for MOTTW: Lack of strategy

E.g. if CBRN is the next threat, and MOTTW is a policy choice of:

1. How to assess our **assumptions** in international and domestic context?
2. How to analyse our **ENDS** and **MEANS**, **threats** and **opportunities** to our **national interests**, as well as **power** and **influence** that we pose?
3. How to translate the ends into *feasible* and *desirable* **objectives**? How do we structure and prioritize them? How do we convert power and influence into *reliable* and *sustainable* **instruments** and use them in *suitable* manners as the **course of actions** to achieve the objectives?
4. Then, what would be the leaderships challenges to formalize this strategy into implementable **policies**.
5. Lastly, how do we measure costs and risks.



Source: Deibel, Terry L., "Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft", Cambridge University Press, 2007



5. CONCLUSION

1. MOOTW in Indonesia is not unique, follow common practices around the world, and legalized in government policies based on objective assessments.
2. MOOTW in Indonesia should be understood case by case because of various characteristics each has, otherwise will risk overgeneralization and misleading.
3. Some are concerned with CMR (politics, civil supremacy), some with CIMIC (inter-agencies management), some other with internal military SOPs (organizational management).
4. There is yet a significant change in the defense strategic planning that reflect we have properly learned from covid-19 pandemic.



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